Abstract. We consider a power utility maximization problem with additive habits in a framework of discrete-time markets and random endowments. For certain classes of incomplete markets, we establish estimates for the optimal consumption stream in terms of the aggregate state price density, investigate the asymptotic behavior of the propensity to consume (ratio of the consumption to the wealth), as the initial endowment tends to infinity, and show that the limit is the corresponding quantity in an artificial market. For complete markets, we concentrate on proving the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in an economy inhabited by heterogeneous individuals who differ with respect to their risk-aversion coefficient, impatience rate and endowments stream, but possess the same degree of habit-formation. Finally, in a representative agent equilibrium, we compute explicitly the price of a zero coupon bond and the Lucas tree equity, and study its dependence on the habit-formation parameter.
Introduction
The classical problem of an investor optimizing his preference functional by selecting a suitable consumption plan constitutes a significant topic in financial economics and mathematical finance. Since its origins dating back to the seminal work of Merton [20] , the problem has attracted the attention of numerous researches (see e.g. [10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22] ), causing a prominent progress in the development of novel mathematical tools, and an establishment of complex models which in particular aim to appropriately explain important empirical observations. One such modeling issue, which is a central ingredient in the current manuscript, is the habit-formation utility paradigm. In contrast to standard time-separable utility functions, habit preferences enjoy certain properties which are beneficial from an economic and psychological viewpoint. Namely, in this model, the past consumption patterns of an individual carry an impact on his current policy. The intuition behind this model is based on the postulation that decision makers who consume portions of their wealth over time are supposed to develop habits, which will have a firm impact on their subsequent consumption behavior. In particular, the relative desire to consume may be increased if one has become accustomed to high levels of consumption. A vast range of works are devoted to the study of various aspects of the habit-forming utility maximization problem (see [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 21] ).
The present manuscript deals with an individual's discrete-time power utility optimization problem with additive habits. At each period, the current consumption choice is subtracted from a benchmark parameter, which is commonly referred to in the literature as the standard of living index, and is equal to a weighted average of the past consumption stream. Due to the fact that power utility functions are defined on the set of non-negative real numbers, the individual is forced to consume in an addictive manner, since he is not permitted to consume below the benchmark level.
The article can be categorized into two parts, which can be read independently. In the first part (Sections 3 and 4), various classes of incomplete markets are considered: arbitrary incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate, idiosyncratically incomplete markets (see Definition 2.2) and markets of type C (introduced in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] , see Definition 2.1). By exploiting the characterization of the solution of the habit-forming maximization problem in the setting of the preceding markets, which was developed in Muraviev [21] , we provide estimates for the optimal consumption stream in terms of the aggregate state price density. Furthermore, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the ratio of the optimal consumption policy to the wealth (propensity to consume), as the initial endowment tends to infinity, show that the corresponding limit is equal to the propensity to consume in an artificial market, and derive the convergence rate in the setting of some concrete markets. The second part (Section 5) is concerned with a complete market Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We first provide explicit formulas for the so-called representative agent models, that is, a homogeneous economy. We then derive the price of a zero coupon bond and the Lucas tree equity, and prove that these prices are increasing convex functions of the habit-formation coefficient. Secondly, we analyze and prove the existence of an equilibrium for a finite set of heterogeneous individuals that have distinct risk-aversion coefficients, impatience rates and endowments, but coincide in the degree of their habits. The reader is addressed to [5, 6, 8, 12, 16] for an equilibrium related literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce all the essential notions and the introductory results. Section 3 is devoted to the derivation of estimates for the optimal consumption stream. In section 4, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the optimal consumption. Section 5 concludes the paper with the analysis of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Setup and Preliminaries
The setup coincides with the one in Muraviev [21] . We briefly depict the main concepts of the model. There are T +1 periods. Uncertainty is characterized by a finite probability space (Ω, G, P ) and a filtration
.., T, to be the finite-dimensional space of all G k measurable random variables, endowed with the inner product X,
edness of stochastic processes is always meant with respect to (G k ) k=0,...,T , unless otherwise stated. We consider arbitrary incomplete no-arbitrage financial markets consisting of N risky securities and one risk-less bond. The price process of each risky asset i = 1, ..., N is a positive adapted process S i k k=0,...,T
. Each security i = 1, ..., N pays a dividend in the next period. The corresponding divided process is non-negative, adapted and labeled by d . The interest rate process (r k ) k=1,...,T representing the risk-less bond is predictable and non-negative. The payoff space (at each period k = 1, ..., T ) is defined by
and
onto the subspace L k . As shown in Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] , there exists a unique (normalized) state price density (SPD) (M k ) k=0,...,T , which is associated with the wealth spaces (L k ) k=1,...,T : M 0 = 1,
for all k = 1, ..., T , and M k ∈ L k , k = 1, ..., T. This process is referred to as the aggregate SPD. Generally speaking, the aggregate SPD can take non-positive values (see the discussion after Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] ). For simplicity, we consider only markets with a non-vanishing aggregate SPD. The decision maker in our model is trading in the market and aiming to maximize his habit-forming preference functional. The endowment stream (ǫ k ) k=0,...,T of the agent is nonnegative and adapted. A feasible consumption stream is a non-negative adapted process (c k ) k=0,...,T of the form
where W k ∈ L k , k = 0, ..., T , and W T +1 = 0. Here, the processes (W k ) k=1,...,T and
can be interpreted as the wealth and investment of the investor respectively. The corresponding utility maximization problem is:
where B is the set of all feasible consumption policies (c k ) k=0,...,T satisfying the
l , k = 0, ..., T, l = 0, ..., k − 1, measure the impact of the habit-formation affect on the individual. The constants ρ and γ are viewed as the impatience and risk-aversion coefficients respectively. Theorem 2.3 in Muraviev [21] guarantees that there exists a unique strictly positive optimal consumption stream (c * k ) k=0,...,T solving to the optimization problem (2.4). We denote by
for k = 0, ..., T , the perturbed aggregate SPD. We introduce now the following classes of financial markets. Definition 2.1 (Malamud and Trubowitz [17] ). An incomplete market is said to be of class C, if there exists an intermediate filtration (H k ) k=1,...,T such that
(ii) The market is complete with respect to (F k ) k=0,...,T , and the endowment stream (ǫ k ) k=0,...,T is adapted to (G k ) k=0,...,T . (iii) For each k = 0, ..., T − 1, and an arbitrary random variable X ∈ L 2 (F k+1 ),
we have
We now state the following results.
Theorem 2.1. We have
for k = 1, ..., T , where
Proof of Theorem 2.1. See the proof of Theorem 2.3 in Muraviev [21] .
The preceding statement admits a simplified form in the setting of some concrete markets.
Theorem 2.2. For arbitrary incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate, or for idiosyncratically incomplete markets, we have
for all k = 1, ..., T − 1, and
Then, X u 0 is the upper hedging price of the process (X k ) k=1,...,T . The process (X u k ) k=0,...,T is referred to as the upper hedging wealth process.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. See the proof of Proposition 2.17 in Malamud, Trubowitz and Wüthrich [18] .
We provide below estimates for the optimal consumption stream. Theorem 3.3. Let ( c k ) k=0,...,T and ( W k ) k=1,...,T denote the optimal consumption stream and wealth process respectively of an investor trading either in an idiosyncratically incomplete market, or in a market of type C with a deterministic interest rate (i.e., (r k ) k=1,...,T are non-negative constants), and solving the utility maximization problem (2.4). Then, we have
..,T ;n=0,...,l−1 and (m l ) l=0,...,T are given explicitly in (3.6), (3.9), (3.10), (3.13), (3.14) , (3.16) and (3.17) ; the upper hedging wealth processes (ǫ U k ) k=0,...,T and ((−ǫ) U k ) k=0,...,T corresponding to (ǫ k ) k=1,...,T and (−ǫ k ) k=1,...,T respectively, are given in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof is by backward induction. First, observe that by using (2.3) for k = T and the fact that c T ≥ 0, we get that (3.3) for k = T is satisfied with
for all j = 0, ..., T − 1, and
An application of (3.3) for k = T on (2.6) yields
Since the expressions above within the the conditional expectations are H T −measurable, we obtain (3.8)
for j = 0, ..., T − 2, and
Assume now that
G k , and thus we get
where (3.13)
for all k = 1, ..., T . Next, by combining (2.6) with the previous inequality, we obtain 
for all k = 1, ..., T . Finally, we obtain the inequality
, and
One can verify that
This completes the proof.
The following statement is a simplified version of Theorem 3.3 for the case where habits are not incorporated.
Corollary 3.1. Denote by (c k ) k=0,...,T and (W k ) k=1,...,T the optimal consumption and wealth process of an individual trading in a market of type C and solving the utility maximization problem (2.4) with no habits, i.e., β (k) l = 0, for all k = 1, ..., T and l = 0, ..., k − 1. Then, under the notations of Theorem 3.3, the following is satisfied
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The assertion follows immediately from Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 2.9 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] (which corresponds to Theorem 2.1 with no habits) .
Asymptotics
Denote by (c k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=0,...,T and (W k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=0,...,T the optimal consumption stream and wealth process, respectively, solving the utility maximization problem (2.4). Note that the scaling property of the power utility function yields
for all k = 0, ..., T, and
for all k = 1, ..., T . In the current section, we let ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T be fixed, and study the asymptotic behavior (as ǫ 0 → ∞) of the quanteties (4.1) and (4.2), for various models: incomplete markets with a positive aggregate SPD, incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate and idiosyncratically incomplete markets. For these cases, we show that the limits corresponding to (4.1) and (4.2) exist and equal to c k (1, 0, ..., 0) and W k (1, 0, ..., 0), respectively. Therefore, the problem amounts to checking the continuity of the functions
4.1. Positive Aggregate SPD. First, we consider arbitrary incomplete financial markets with a positive aggregate SPD (M k ) k=0,...,T . In this setting, we let (c *
..,T denote the corresponding optimal consumption stream and wealth process respectively. We set further c * k = c * k (1, 0..., 0), k = 0, ..., T , and W * k = c * k (1, 0..., 0), k = 1, ..., T . By Theorem 2.1 and identity (2.3), we have
for all k = 1, ..., T , where
We exhibit now the main result of the subsection.
Theorem 4.4. We have
, for all k = 0, ..., T , and
We first prove the following weaker result.
Lemma 4.2. We have
P −a.s, for all k = 0, ..., T − 1, and
Proof of Lemma 4.2. To simplify notations (ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T are fixed), we de-
≥ 0, P −a.s. Assume that there exists some constant a 1 < 0 such that P lim inf ǫ0→∞ W1(ǫ0) ǫ0
< a 1 > 0. Then, since the optimal consumption stream and (M k ) k=0,...,T are positive, and c 1 (
< a 2 > 0, for some a 2 < 0. Continuing inductively, we obtain that P lim inf ǫ0→∞
< a T > 0, for some constant a T < 0. This is a contradiction since c T (ǫ 0 ) is positive and c t (ǫ 0 ) = ǫ T + W T (ǫ 0 ). In the same way, one checks that lim inf ǫ0→∞ < ∞, P −a.s. The identity
G k , for k = 1, ..., T , the fact that lim inf ǫ0→∞
.., T, and the positivity of the process (M k ) k=0,...,T conclude the proof for the upper limits. Next, we treat the lower limits. First, we claim that
0 . Assume on the contrary that this is not the case, and multiply the first order condition (2.5) for k = 1 by c γ 0 (ǫ 0 ):
By Theorem 2.1 (recall that (R * ) k=0,...,T is a positive SPD), we have
Therefore, we get a contradiction by applying an expectation on both sides of the equation, and observing that lim sup
whereas the right hand side is bounded. In the same manner, one checks that
P −a.s., and we conclude that lim inf
In the same manner, one can verify that
, for all k = 1, ..., T −1. Now, assume on the contrary that lim inf ǫ0→∞ c0(ǫ0) ǫ0 = 0. Observe that we can rewrite (2.3) for k = 0 as
c0(ǫ0) < ∞), we get a contradiction. In particular, lim ǫ0→∞ c 0 (ǫ 0 ) = ∞, and thus inequality (4.11) becomes lim inf ǫ0→∞
, for all k = 1, ..., T. The proof is now accomplished by noting that the preceding observations applied on (4.9) and (4.11) yield lim inf
Corollary 4.2. We have
P −a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T, and
Proof of Corollary 4.2. The assertion follows from the lower limits established in Lemma 4.2.
We are now ready to prove the main result of the subsection. k , P −a.s., for k = 0, ..., T, and lim n→∞
k , P −a.s., for k = 1, ..., T , and i = 1, 2, where 0 < c (i) k < ∞, P −a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T , and 0 < W (i) k < ∞, P −a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T , and i = 1, 2. Now, by multiplying equations (2.5) and (2.3) by (ǫ n i ) γ and (ǫ n i ) −1 respectively, and then letting n → ∞, we obtain the following identities:
for all k = 0, ..., T − 1, i = 1, 2, where
for all k = 1, ..., T , i = 1, 2, and
, for i = 1, 2. Note that the above system of equations corresponds to the solution of the utility maximization (2.4) with the endowments ǫ 0 = 1 and ǫ k = 0 for all k = 1, ..., T (see (4.3) and (4.4)). Therefore, the uniqueness of the optimal consumption stream and the wealth process implies that: lim ǫ0→∞ c k (ǫ0) ǫ0
exists, P −a.s., for each k = 0, ..., T ; lim ǫ0→∞
exists, P −a.s., for each k = 1, ..., T ; [21] and Theorem 2.14 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] simplifies substantially the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the quantities (4.1) and (4.2), for idiosyncratically incomplete markets and markets of type C with habits, and arbitrary incomplete markets with no habits. Furthermore, it allows us to establish the convergence rates. Denote by ( c k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=0,...,T and ( W k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=1,...,T ((c k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=0,...,T and (W k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=1,...,T ) the optimal consumption and wealth process respectively of an investor solving the utility maximization problem (2.4) in an incomplete market with a deterministic interest rate (idiosyncratically incomplete market). We set further c k := c k (1, 0, ..., 0), c k := c k (1, 0, ..., 0), k = 0, ..., T, and
14)
for all k = 1, ..., T, and
.., ǫ T )) k=0,...,T and (W k (ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ T )) k=1,...,T are C ∞ −differentiable with respect to each variable ǫ j , j = 1, ..., T . In particular, we have
as ǫ 0 → ∞, P −a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T , and
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The differentiability follows the same ideas as those in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Muraviev [21] , based on the implicit function theorem, and thus is omitted. The rates of convergence follows directly from differentiability, (4.1) and (4.2).
Consider the utility maximization problem (2.4) with no habits, i.e., β [17] (which coincides with Theorem 2.1 with no habits), we have
If the market is of type C, we get
for k = 1, ..., T, and 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. The assertion follows from Theorem 2.14 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] .
Equilibrium
We consider throughout the section preferences with static type of habits that are assigned according to a last period consumption. Namely, β 
Due to the static structure of the habit-forming coefficients, and the fact that the market is complete, the first order conditions (2.6) can be re-expressed in a simplified form:
for all k = 1, ..., T, where, in the current setting, the perturbed (aggregate) SPD is given by
for all k = 0, ..., T. Therefore, the recursive relation 
at each period k = 0, ..., T .
Homogeneous Economy.
We consider now an economy which is populated by an agent of one type, that is, N = 1. The risk-aversion, habit-formation parameter, impatience coefficient and endowments stream are denoted by γ, β, ρ and (ǫ k ) k=0,...,T , respectively. The associated optimal consumption stream of the individual is denoted by (c k ) k=0,...,T .
Theorem 5.7. In a homogeneous economy, there exists an equilibrium if and only if
for all k = 1, ..., T, where ǫ −1 := 0. Furthermore, the corresponding equilibrium SPD is unique and given by M 0 = 1,
, for all k = 1, ..., T − 1, and
Remark 5.1. A sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium is:
Proof of Theorem 5.7. We impose the market clearing condition c k = ǫ k , for all k = 0, ..., T , which in particular guarantees that budget constraint (5.2) is satisfied. By (5.3) for k = 1, we have
Recall that M 0 = 1 + βE M 1 , hence
Next, by (5.3) for k = 2 and the identity
As in (5.10), this implies that
Recall that M 1 = M 1 + βE M 2 G 1 . Therefore, by plugging (5.11) into the preceding equation and recalling (5.10), we get
proving that
for all k = 1, ..., T. Now, assume that for k < T − 1, we have
Recall that the first order conditions (5.3) combined with the identity
and hence, as in (5.10) and (5.11), we get
thus we get (5.14)
As above, we have
, and thus
Recall that M k+1 = M k+1 + βE M k+2 G k+1 , hence, in virtue of (5.14) and (5.15), we get
proving the validity of a similar identity as in (5.13) for k + 1. The equality M T = M T asserts that
Finally, it is not hard to verify that the latter identity and (5.13), k = 1, ..., T − 1 yield (5.8) and (5.9). The proof is complete.
Remark 5.2. Assume that β = 0. In this case, the sufficient and necessary conditions (5.6) and (5.7) are satisfied, and thus M k = e −ρk (ǫ k /ǫ 0 ) −γ , for all k = 0, ..., T .
Zero Coupon Bonds and Lucas Tree Equity.
In the current subsection, we compute explicitly the price of a zero coupon bond and the Lucas tree equity, in the setting of homogenous equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these prices are increasing convex functions of the habit-formation parameter. For each T ∈ N, consider a sequence of i.i.d random variables X 1 , ..., X T such that X k > β + β 1/γ e −ρ/γ , P − a.s., for each k = 1, ..., T. Assume that the aggregate endowment process (ǫ k ) k=0,...,T is a geometric random walk, i.e., ǫ o = 1, and
The filtration representing the market is generated by the aggregate endowment process, i.e., G k = σ (ǫ 1 , ..., ǫ k ) , k = 0, ..., T. Observe that by Remark 5.1, the sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium are satisfied, and thus the SPD is given by (5.8) and (5.9).
Zero coupon bonds. The price of a zero coupon bond at time k maturing at time m is defined by
It is not hard to check by using (5.8) and (5.9) that
for all T ≥ k ≥ 1, and
Observe that asymptotically, the yield of the zero coupon bond B F (0, T ) ignores the habit-formation coefficient, namely,
Let us now examine the qualitative behavior of the zero coupon bond B F (0, T ) as a function of β, for a fixed time horizon. We fix some β * > 0 and assume that 
Thus we conclude that the zero coupon bond B F (0, T ) is an increasing convex function of β.
Example 5.1. Consider a market with T = 1, Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 }, P ({ω i }) = 1/2, for i = 1, 2, X 1 (ω 1 ) = 3 and X 1 (ω 2 ) = 4. The agent is represented by γ = 2, ρ = 0 and the habit-formation coefficient is some parameter β ∈ [0, 1] (that is, β * = 1).
As illustrated in Figure 1 ., the zero coupon bond (which is in fact the interest rate) viewed as a function of β, is given by Lucas Tree Equity. An asset with a dividend being equal to the aggregate endowment is called the Lucas tree equity. Its price at time k = 0, ..., T is given by
It is not hard to verify by using (5.8) and (5.9) that
for k = 1, ..., T , and
Assume that e −ρ E X 1−γ 1 < 1, then the long-run Lucas tree equity is given by
By a direct computation (similarly as in the case of zero coupon bonds), one can check that S ǫ (0,∞) is an increasing convex function of the habit-formation parameter β. 
for all k = 1, ..., T. Then, there exists an equilibrium. 
Thus M T = g T (λ 1 , ..., λ N ) is a candidate for a SPD at the maturity date. Recall
Note that for each ω ∈ Ω there exists j(ω) ∈ {1, ..., N } such that
or equivalently
which yields
Therefore, we have i . Furthermore, note that in order to get an equilibrium, it is left to check that the budget constraints (5.2) are satisfied for the candidates of the SPD constructed above. Consequently, it suffices to prove that there exists a vector (λ * 1 , ..., λ * N ) ∈ R N ++ such that h i (λ * 1 , ..., λ * N ) = 0, for all i = 1, ..., N. To this end, it is sufficient to check that the following properties are satisfied (by a standard fixed-point argument as in Theorem 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. [19] ):
(1) Each function h i , i = 1, ..., N is homogeneous of degree 0 (i.e., h i (tλ 1 , ..., tλ N ) = h i (λ 1 , ..., λ N ), for all (λ 1 , ..., λ N ) ∈ R N ++ and t > 0). This follows from the fact that g k , k = 0, ..., T and g k , k = 0, ..., T, are homogeneous of degree 1 (i.e., 
